HERTOG WAR STUDIES PROGRAM
OVERVIEW OF COURSE SCHEDULE 2014

This program is reading intensive. In this course schedule overview details of the readings have not been included. Lessons are day-long; some are divided into two blocks when they address different topics.

Lesson 1, Sunday, July 27: Language and logic of war

Objectives:
1. Learn the basic vocabulary needed to discuss war and military operations
2. Understand how to read military maps and symbols

Readings:
- U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States
- Carl H. Builder, The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis
- U.S. Department of the Army, Army Field Manual 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics

Lesson 2, Monday, July 28: One Napoleonic battle--Jena/Jomini

Purpose: Apply the terms and concepts you learned in Lesson 1 to the study of a particular campaign and then understand how two great military theorists did so.

Objectives:
1. Understand the Jena Campaign of 1806
   a. Learn how to read military operational history with maps
2. Evaluate Clausewitz and Jomini as military theorists based on the lessons they derived from the 1806 campaign
   a. Note that Clausewitz wrote an analytical and evaluative history of the campaign, whereas Jomini drew general lessons from the 1806 campaign and many other Napoleonic and pre-Napoleonic conflicts—How much did the difference in approaches to drawing lessons affect the lessons that were drawn?
   b. Think about the question: “Are there rules or laws of military operations similar to those that exist in physics?”

Block 1: The Jena Campaign, 1806
- Hew Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War
- Peter Paret, The Cognitive Challenge of War: Prussia 1806
- Clausewitz, On War

Block 2: Clausewitz and Jomini
- Clausewitz, Notes on Prussia in Her Great Catastrophe
- John Shy, “Jomini,” in Makers of Modern Strategy
- For Jomini: Art of War
Lesson 3, Tuesday, July 29: Clausewitz (friction, contrasting superficial with substantive understandings of war)

Purpose: Learn an additional language to describe military operations and theory, and evaluate the utility of that language in understanding traditional military theory.

Objectives:
1. Learn the basic concepts of nonlinearity, complexity, and chaos theory in the scientific/mathematical context from which they arose
2. Evaluate the validity of applying those concepts to the understanding of On War
3. Explore the utility of reading the work of Helmuth von Moltke the Elder through the prism of nonlinearity, complexity, and chaos theory

Block 1: Chaos, Nonlinearity, and Complexity
- Edward Lorenz, The Essence of Chaos
- Alan Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the Unpredictability of War,” in Thomas J. Czerwinski, Coping with the Bounds: A Neo-Clausewitzian Primer

Block 2: Chaos Theory, Clausewitz, and Moltke
- Clausewitz, On War
- Helmuth von Moltke, “On Strategy, 1871,” in Moltke on the Art of War

Lesson 4, Wednesday, July 30: Gettysburg Staff Ride (Off-Site, Day-Long Trip)

Purpose: Learn how to move from reading text and maps to seeing a battle unfold on terrain.

Objectives:
1. Understand how to “see” terrain using military cartography
2. Understand how terrain affects combat in particular technological and doctrinal circumstances
3. Understand how the operational war interacts with tactical decision-making before and during combat
4. Understand how strategic considerations shape tactical decision-making

Readings:
- Mark Grimsley and Brooks Simpson, Gettysburg: A Battlefield Guide

Lesson 5, Thursday, July 31: Politics and War: Clausewitz vs. Moltke

Purpose: Reflect upon the correct relationship between military operations and high politics (or policy) in order to decide whether you believe that Clausewitz or Moltke had it right.
Objectives:

1. Understand Clausewitz’s views on the relationship between politics (policy) and military operations at every level. Are his views coherent or contradictory?
2. Evaluate Moltke’s portrayal of Clausewitz’s views (consider both the Moltke reading and the footnote in On War noted below). Did Moltke get it right?
3. Why was this dispute of such moment to Moltke? (Look to the Craig reading for this.)
4. Was Moltke wrong, or had Clausewitz simply failed to foresee the kind of challenge Moltke faced?

Block 1: Clausewitz on Politics and War
   - Clausewitz, On War

Block 2: Moltke and Clausewitz
   - Gordon A. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945
   - Helmuth von Moltke, (Daniel J. Hughes, ed.), Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings
   - Clausewitz, Carl von Clausewitz: Two Letters on Strategy

Lesson 6, Friday, August 1: Mechanization of war

Purpose: Understand how changes in technology generated (required) transformations in military organization, doctrine, and theory.

Reading:
   - Dennis Showalter, Railroads and Rifles,
   - Martin van Creveld, Technology and War

Lesson 7, Saturday, August 2: Schlieffen through stalemate / Birth of armored warfare

Purpose: Decide which of the following are true:
1. Stalemate was the inevitable result of the military technology of the time
2. The German attack in 1914 failed because of Moltke’s changes to Schlieffen’s plan
3. The 1914 attack failed because Schlieffen designed it mechanistically and in disregard of Moltke’s dictum that no plan survives first contact with the enemy
4. The attack failed because Schlieffen sought Napoleonic-style decisive victories in an era in which they were no longer possible
5. World War I represented a failure at the tactical level—or at the operational level?—or at the strategic level?

Block 1: Schlieffen and the First Campaign of World War I
   - James L. Stokesbury, A Short History of World War I
   - Gunther Rothenberg, “Moltke, Schlieffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment,” in Makers of Modern Strategy
   - “The ‘Schlieffen’ Plan,” Terence Zuber, German War Planning, 1891-1914: Sources and Interpretations
Block 2: Coping with Trench-warfare Stalemate
  • Timothy Lupfer, The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War

Sunday, August 3: Reading Day

Lesson 8, Monday, August 4: Armored Warfare and Operational Art

Purpose: Understand the evolution of operational art as a distinct branch of military theory and practice.

Readings:
  • Wilhelm Deist, “The Road to Ideological War: Germany 1918-1945,” in Williamson Murray, The Making of Strategy
  • Eric von Manstein, Lost Victories
  • Dennis Showalter, Hitler’s Panzers
  • David Glantz, Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle

Lesson 9, Tuesday, August 5: Airpower--Douhet to Warden to AirSea Battle to Iraq and Kosovo in the 1990s

Purpose: Understand the terms and concepts of air power theory as it evolved from early in the 20th century to the present.

Objectives:
  1. Understand the rationale for seeing airpower as fundamentally revolutionary in the first half of the 20th Century
  2. Evaluate the nature of the debate over the right relationship between airpower and other forms of military power in that time
  3. Master the concept of “center of gravity” as it is used in the context of airpower theory
  4. Consider both operational art and airpower theory in the context of nonlinearity, complexity, and chaos theory
  5. Evaluate the roles of airpower and ground combat power in the initial phases of the attacks against Iraq in 1991 and 2003.

Block 1: From the Origins of Air Power Theory to Its Modern State
  • David MacIsaac, "Voices from the Central Blue: The Air Power Theorists," Makers of Modern Strategy,
  • Philip Meilinger, Paths to Heaven
  • John Warden, The Air Campaign

Block 2: Iraq 1991 and Kosovo
  • Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, Summary Report
  • Benjamin Lambeth, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment
Lesson 10, Wednesday, August 6: McChrystal and Petraeus on Command

On-Site Visitors: Senior Active Duty General Officer; Gen. Stanley McChrystal (U.S. Army, Ret.); and Gen. David Petraeus (U.S. Army, Ret.)

Purpose: What is command and how do leaders manifest it?

Objectives:
1. Consider the development of the Joint Special Operations Task Force in Iraq as a revolutionary new application of operational art. Was it successful? Why or why not?

   Block 1: Gen. Martin Dempsey (U.S. Army)
   • Martin Dempsey, “The Bend of Power,” Foreign Policy Magazine
   Block 2: Gen. Stanley McChrystal (U.S. Army, Ret.)
   • Stan McChrystal, My Share of the Task
   Block 3: Gen. David Petraeus (U.S. Army, Ret.)

Lesson 11, Thursday, August 7: Iraq -- 2003 Invasion to the Insurgency and the Surge

Purpose: Is counterinsurgency a different phenomenon from the rest of modern war?

Objectives:
1. Evaluate whether counterinsurgency can be understood with terms and concepts of modern, conventional warfare.
2. Understand campaign design in counterinsurgency and its relationship to political outcomes.
3. Understand differences between civilian and military approaches to a counterinsurgency, and understand how civilian and military agencies worked together to achieve objectives during the surge.


Lesson 12, Friday, August 8: The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)

OFF-SITE VISIT TO THE PENTAGON

Readings:
• Wide-ranging list of ISW publications